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ABSTRACT
Many things we deal with in our daily lives seem to be products of our mental, intentional 
states. John Searle (1996, 2010) defended this thesis, and offered a characterization of the 
“intentionality-relative features of the world”. The present paper aims at contributing to our 
understanding of the nature of such entities. It presents and criticises Searle’s claims on the 
general properties of the intentionality-relative features of the world. An original characteri-
zation is offered in the paper, as a consequence of modifications I suggest making to Searle’s 
account, mainly in respect to the epistemological status of such entities.
Keywords: intentionality, intentionality-relative features of the world, ontological subjectivity, 
epistemological objectivity.
As an introductory remark about his views concerning what is social, John Searle claims in 
The Construction of the Social Reality that social entities are among the “portions of the real world 
[…] that exist only because we believe them to exist” (1996, p. 1). In Making the Social World 
(2010), Searle does not place the condition for the existence of such entities specifically on be-
liefs. Social entities are said to be intentionality-relative features of the world (henceforth, IRs). 
Notwithstanding its rather recent occurrence, the term appropriately represents Searle’s earlier 
views. Searle (2010) suggests the term ‘intentionality-relative features of the world’ as a substitute 
for ‘observer-relative features of the world,’ which was largely employed in his former book. The 
present paper investigates the notion of intentionality-relative features of the world. Its aim is 
to reveal general aspects of IRs that distinguish them from brute, natural features of the world. 
The paper proceeds, first, by considering claims made by Searle about IRs. Afterwards, it offers a 
criticism of these claims, and suggests modifications when they seem problematic. 
Social entities, artefacts, and actions, among other things, seem to depend on mental, in-
tentional states, in the sense that if the latter did not exist, neither could the former. Common 
sense also teaches that such intentionality-relative entities exist, or in other words, that they are 
features of the world. Contrary to common sense, however, philosophers may hold an eliminativ-
ist view with regard to intentionality-relative entities. It is not my intention here to criticize this 
view. I take here for granted that at least some intentionality-relative entities exist, and attempt 
to characterize their nature.
A reflection on the meaning of the terms that compose the expression “intentionality-rel-
ative features of the world” is an appropriate starting point for the present investigation. “Inten-
tionality” is a philosophical term of art. According to a fairly unproblematic characterization, in-
tentionality is a property that some entities have in virtue of being about something. My current 
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belief that it is raining is intentional, because it is about a par-
ticular state of affairs. Traffic lights are intentional, because 
they are about the actions that drivers have to undertake 
when they are in front of them. IRs are conceived as embrac-
ing things that are real, since they are referred to as “features 
of the world.” The term “intentionality-relative” indicates an 
aspect by means of which IRs differ from mere intentional 
objects. Although the rain of which my belief is about is an 
intentional object, it is not relative to or dependent on inten-
tionality. On the other hand, IRs are explicitly characterized 
as being dependent on or relative to intentional entities. 
In The Construction of Social Reality, Searle offers both a 
negative and a positive characterization of IRs. The negative 
characterization consists in the distinction he draws between 
IRs and “those features we might call intrinsic to nature” 
(Searle, 1996, p. 9). The intrinsic features of the world cover 
things of two different kinds. On the one hand, they include 
things that are ontologically objective, i.e., things whose mode 
of existence is “independent of any perceiver or any mental 
state” (Searle, 1996, p. 8). On the other hand, they include 
mental states (Searle, 1996, p. 10f.), which are ontologically 
subjective, in the sense that “their mode of existence depends 
on […] subjects” (Searle, 1996, p. 8). As an illustration: both 
my belief that it is snowing and the snow itself are said to be 
intrinsic features of the world. 
One might consider the negative characterization to be 
circular. Besides the fact that they are not intentionality-rela-
tive, there does not seem to be an interesting common aspect 
that mental states share with ontologically objective things. 
Searle seems to rely on their independency from intention-
ality (which differs from the kind of independency that char-
acterizes the ontologically objective) to distinguish intrinsic 
features of the world from IRs. The resulting negative charac-
terization of IRs as things that differ from things that are not 
intentionality-relative is, indeed, circular. However, it turns 
out to be informative if we consider the kinds of things that 
are said to be independent from intentionality. According to 
this negative characterization, intentionality-relative features 
of the world are neither ontologically objective things nor 
mental states. In order to avoid a form of question-begging 
against physicalist or psychologist theories of IRs, I argue for 
a more modest approach, which says that IRs do not seem to 
be physical or mental. 
IRs do not seem to be physical in the strict sense of the 
term because, first, they are not the subject of physical theo-
ries, and, second, there are pragmatic and historical reasons to 
keep them out of the scope of physics in times to come. IRs do 
not seem to be physical in a derivative sense because the claim 
that they are realized by the physical is a matter of controver-
sy. None of these reasons, however, justifies the peremptory 
claim that intentionality-relative features of the world are not 
physical. If one of the metaphysical theses of physicalism is 
correct, then IRs are physical in some sense.
The claim that IRs are not mental states is supported 
by evidence that mental states are not necessarily intention-
ality-relative. Although conscious states might consist in a 
mental state being the object of another (intentional) mental 
state, as suggested by the higher-order monitoring theories 
of consciousness, this is not a condition for something to be 
a mental state in the first place. Another reason for distin-
guishing IRs from the mental is that they do not necessarily 
manifest the properties traditionally attributed to mental 
states. According to Searle, mental states have the distinc-
tive properties of possessing phenomenal quality and/or 
being intentional, i.e., being about something (Searle, 1996, 
p. 7). Although some IRs might be said to posses phenom-
enal qualityone might insist that there is some particular 
phenomenal state that is what is like to be the president of 
the United Statesor intentionality, in the case of linguistic 
tokens, some IRs do not seem to have any of these proper-
ties. There is no phenomenal state that is what is like to be a 
hammer, and it also lacks intentionality, in the sense that it is 
not about something else. Despite these differences, however, 
if IRs are reducible to mental states or events, then they are 
mental states in some sense.
In The Construction of Social Reality, we find a positive 
characterization of observer-relative features of the world, 
which we might take to characterize IRs as follows:
(i) IRs are ontologically subjective (p. 10);
(ii) “some […] are epistemically objective” (p. 10);
(iii)   they “exist relative to the intentionality of observ-
ers, users, etc” (p. 9).
Let us consider the steps of this positive characterization 
of IRs and the reasons for acknowledging or rejecting them.
The characterization presented in (i) is unproblematic. 
As stated above, Searle conceives the category of the onto-
logically subjective as comprehending things whose mode of 
existence depends on subjects. Mental states are paradigmat-
ic examples of ontologically subjective entities. Conscious or 
phenomenal states, such as tokens of pain, are ontologically 
subjective, “because their mode of existence depends on being 
felt by subjects” (Searle, 1996, p. 8). A similar claim is evident 
in respect to intentional mental states. They could not occur 
without a subject to entertain them.
The category of the ontologically subjective is not re-
stricted to mental states. By definition, the existence of IRs 
depends on intentional entities, which are either mental 
states or other IRs, such as symbolic and linguistic tokens. 
The IRs that are themselves intentional entities depend, ul-
timately, on mental states that impose on them the function 
of “representing” or “standing for” other things (Searle, 1996, 
p. 21). Given the transitivity of dependence, IRs are ontolog-
ically subjective.
In contrast to (i), the remarks made in (ii) and (iii) are 
problematic to a certain extent. I begin with an analysis of the 
third attributed aspect, since its results justify the use of the 
term “intentionality-relative feature of the world,” instead of 
Searle’s original term, “observer-relative features of the world”.
In Making the Social World, Searle acknowledges that the 
expression “observer-relative features of the world” can be 
misleading, and introduces the alternative term. In his words: 
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[The expression] seems to imply that it is 
outside observers, adopting the anthropo-
logical standpoint, who assign observer-rel-
ative statuses to peoples and objects. But 
that is not my intention at all. […] So instead 
of saying ‘observer-relative’ I am going to 
use the expression ‘intentionality relative’. 
What I want to convey is that people’s atti-
tudes are necessary to constitute something 
as money, government, political parties, or 
final examinations (2010, p. 17).
Like the term “observer-relative,” the characterization of 
IRs presented in (iii) is compatible with the view that obser-
vation plays a necessary and sufficient role in the constitution 
of IRs. Moreover, the possibility of conceiving IRs as being 
constituted by outside observers is not the only possible mis-
understanding that might arise from (iii). It is also possible 
to interpret the sentence “IRs exist relative to the intention-
ality of observers, users, etc.” as asserting that subjects must 
be somehow interacting with the entities in question, i.e., by 
observing them or using them.
The two possible ways of misunderstanding the notion 
of intentionality-relative features of the world are avoided if 
intentional states are conceived as being distinct from con-
scious episodes. A careful reading of Searle’s position supports 
this view. Searle argues that instances of intentional states can 
extend over the period of time in which the subject has no 
consciousness of them (1996, p. 7). Accordingly, my belief 
that knights move in L-shapes in chess persists even when I 
do not consciously entertain this thought. The characteriza-
tion of intentional states as “people’s attitudes” in the passage 
quoted above also indicates that they are distinct from con-
scious episodes. Accordingly, I argue that, instead of (iii), the 
dependency of IRs with respect to intentional states is more 
appropriately represented in the following claim:
(iii)*  IRs are relative to intentional states of subjects, 
which persist even when subjects are not conscious 
of them. 
Step (ii) of the positive characterization presented above 
asserts that some IRs are epistemically objective. This state-
ment might suggest that some IRs are not epistemically ob-
jective, but, by exclusion, epistemically subjective. We should 
ask in what sense some IRs are said to be epistemically objec-
tive and others epistemically subjective.
Searle claims that the predicates “epistemically objective” 
and “epistemically subjective” apply primarily to judgments 
and, derivatively, to facts. He distinguishes epistemologically 
objective judgments from epistemologically subjective judg-
ments by means of the role that opinions might play in de-
termining their truth-value. The term “opinion” stands for 
“attitudes, feelings and points of view” (Searle, 1996, p. 8). 
According to Searle’s distinction, if the truth-value of a judg-
ment can be ascertained independently of any opinion, then 
the judgment is epistemically objective. If the truth-value 
of a judgment is a matter of opinion, then it is epistemically 
subjective. “Socrates is ugly” and “Hippias is beautiful” would, 
thus, be examples of epistemically subjective judgments; “the 
earth moves around the sun,” an example of an epistemically 
objective judgment. 
The predicates “epistemically objective” and “epistemical-
ly subjective” apply to facts in accordance with the kind of judg-
ment whose truth-value is determined by the fact in question. 
According to this classification, a fact is epistemically objective 
if it determines the truth-value of an epistemically objective 
judgment. It is epistemically subjective if it determines the 
truth-value of an epistemically subjective judgment.
The statement “some intentionality-relative features of 
the world are epistemically subjective” cannot be interpreted 
as stating that IRs make epistemically subjective judgments 
true. Consider some examples of judgments about IRs to 
illustrate this point. “The present paper is about IRs” is an 
epistemically objective judgment about an intentionality-rel-
ative feature of the world, namely, the present paper. It is 
made true by the paper itself. Thus, the present paper is said 
to be epistemically objective. In contrast, the judgment “the 
present paper is interesting” is epistemically subjective, since 
its truth-value is determined by the “attitudes, feelings and 
points of view” of the author and the readers. The role played 
by opinions in determining the truth-value of an epistemi-
cally subjective judgment does not imply that such opinions 
are the only things upon which the truth of the judgment de-
pends. If the present paper did not exist, then the statement 
that it is interesting would be false. However, the existence of 
the present paper does not determine the truth of the judg-
ment in question.
We have seen that, according to Searle, the predicate 
“epistemically subjective” applies to judgments of a certain 
class, as well as to the “attitudes, feelings and points of view” 
that determine the truth-value of those judgments. If some 
IRs are epistemically subjective, then these must be either 
epistemically subjective judgments or the mental states that 
determine the truth-value of these judgments. As a conse-
quence of Searle’s negative characterization, according to 
which IRs are not mental states, the claim that some IRs are 
epistemically subjective must be understood as stating that 
some IRs are epistemically subjective judgments. In contrast, 
epistemically objective IRs can be either epistemically objec-
tive judgments or the facts that make these judgments true.
There is another way of interpreting the distinction be-
tween what is epistemically subjective and what is epistemi-
cally objective. I take this alternative distinction to be much 
more appealing than the one presented by Searle, since it is 
informative about the distinct ways in which our own mental 
states and external features of the world can be known.
Instead of applying only to judgments whose truth-value 
depends on opinions, the predicate “epistemically subjective” 
can be understood as applying to what is accessible, or can be 
known in a way that is peculiarly related to each individual 
subject. Our own mental states are said to be accessible to us 
in this peculiar way. Davidson, for instance, asserts that: 
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We know in a way no one else can what we 
believe, fear, want, value, and intend. We 
know how things seem to us, how they look 
to us, feel to us, smell and sound to us to 
be. We know these things in a way that we 
can never know about the world around us 
(2001c [1990], p. 193).
According to Davidson, the knowledge that individual 
subjects have of their own mental states is peculiarly relat-
ed to them in many respects. Most importantly for the cate-
gorical distinction I wish to stress, Davidson argues that this 
knowledge is obtained in an unmediated, direct way. 
The unmediated, direct access to our own mental states 
seems to grant us an authority concerning our knowledge 
of them. This first-person authority consists in the fact that 
a person is normally right about her beliefs concerning her 
own mental states. Davidson acknowledges that this kind 
of knowledge is not always indubitable and correct (David-
son, 2001a [1984], p. 4). Someone might be mistaken about 
one or another mental state she thinks she has. However, as 
Davidson argues, error and uncertainty “arises only rarely in 
the cases of beliefs about our own states of mind” (Davidson, 
2001d [1991], p. 205). Given that it is rare, the possibility of 
mistake does not threaten the authority a person has con-
cerning the knowledge of her own mental states (Davidson, 
2001b [1987], p. 15).
According to Davidson, first-person authority is jus-
tified by the fact that a person knows how she understands 
the elements (concepts or words) that constitute her men-
tal states. A second person would have to interpret, based on 
utterances and other kinds of overt behaviour, how the first 
person understands these elements. Cases of utterances re-
veal a clear distinction between the two ways of access to the 
contents of one’s mind. A hearer needs to interpret the con-
cepts or the meaning that the speaker assigns to his words. In 
contrast, Davidson argues, a speaker “cannot, in the same way, 
interpret his own words” (Davidson, 2001a [1984], p. 12; see 
also Davidson, 2001b [1987], p. 37).
The knowledge we have about the external world, like 
the knowledge we have about other minds, seems to be me-
diated by evidence and, thus, indirect. The mediated nature 
of this knowledge implies a lack of authority over it, in the 
sense that “each of our beliefs about the world, taken alone, 
may be false” (Davidson, 2001c [1990], p. 194). In contrast to 
knowledge of our own mental states, individual beliefs about 
the world can be false because of a lack of evidence, false con-
clusions based on the evidence we have, etc. 
Instead of employing the predicate “epistemically ob-
jective” in the way suggested by Searle, I take it to be more 
fruitful to use it to distinguish what we can only know about 
in a mediated, indirect way. Physical and natural entities in 
general are paradigmatic examples of things that deserve the 
predicate “epistemically objective” in this sense. Our knowl-
edge concerning the nature of physical entities (such as nat-
ural satellites or radioactivity) and about their occurrences 
(expressed in “there is just one natural satellite orbiting the 
earth” and “that sample is radioactive”) can only be obtained 
if we interpret evidence. This constraint applies not only to 
cases in which such knowledge is obtained by means of in-
dividual experience or experimentation, but also to cases in 
which it is obtained strictly by means of a reliable communi-
cation. When an expert tells us, after taking the appropriate 
measurements, that some sample is radioactive, we have to 
interpret her words in order to know that fact.
Natural entities are not the only things we normally 
consider to inhabit the external world. Intentionality-relative 
features of world, people, and maybe some other things are 
also expected to be out there. The question of whether they 
all should be considered epistemically objective is an interest-
ing one. With respect to the intentionality-relative features 
of the world, it can be argued that some of us have a certain 
authority concerning the knowledge of their nature.
By means of reflection, we are able to recognize that a 
significant number of IRs are not simply relative to intention-
al states, but are also conceived as the intended products of 
some productive activity. I refer to these as intended IRs, and 
distinguish them from those that are unintended or by-prod-
ucts. Artefacts, such as a knife and a table, and institutional 
entities, such as a reading group, are good examples of the for-
mer kind. Recession and pollution are good examples of the 
latter.
The recognition that some IRs are the intended prod-
ucts of those who actively constitute or produce them may 
be thought to justify the claim that some people have a privi-
leged epistemic position concerning their nature. Thomasson 
(2003, 2007) argues in favour of this position with respect 
to both artefacts and institutional entities. According to her, 
those who constitute these entities intend them to instantiate 
a certain group of properties, and the success of their produc-
tive activity is measured by the degree to which these proper-
ties are imposed on the product.
An artefact is generally conceived as the product of its 
maker’s intention, an intention directed towards the pro-
duction of an item of that very kind.2 Thomasson distin-
guishes two possible ways of interpreting the requirement of 
a maker’s intention to produce an artefact of a determinate 
kind (Thomasson, 2003, p. 595). On one reading, the maker 
does not need to know the features that specify the kind in 
question, but is acquainted with the kind by means of a sam-
ple of its extension. In this case, the maker intends “merely 
to make something of ‘the same type as these’” (Thomasson, 
2003, p. 595). On another reading, the maker must know 
the features that specify the nature of a certain artefactual 
kind and, in accordance with this knowledge, she may try 
to impose those features on the artefact. Thomasson says 
2 Thomasson (2007, p. 53) presents this as a conceptual truth.
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that the first reading demands from the maker only a trans-
parent understanding of the artefactual kind, while the sec-
ond demands an opaque understanding. Accordingly, I call 
the different interpretations “the transparent reading” and 
“opaque reading”. 
Thomasson presents two problems with the transparent 
reading of the requirement for the maker to intend to produce 
an artefact of a determinate kind. First, the requirement that 
the maker be acquainted with a sample of the kind’s exten-
sion leaves prototypes out of the picture (Thomasson, 2003, 
p. 595). A prototype, i.e., the first instantiation of a certain 
artefactual kind, cannot be produced with the intention to re-
semble other instantiations of that kind. Second, if the maker 
does not know the specific features of the artefactual kind, 
she might fail to produce an artefact of this kind (Thomasson, 
2003, p. 596). The maker might produce something similar 
to artefacts of a certain kind, but which would not be recog-
nized as belonging to this kind by anyone else.
The opaque reading of the requirement for the maker to 
intend to produce an artefact of a certain kind is manifested 
in Risto Hilpinen’s characterization of the notion of artefact. 
He presents his position as follows:
I take an object to be an artifact in the strict 
sense of the word only if it is intentionally 
produced by an agent under some descrip-
tion of the object. The intention “ties” to 
the object a number of descriptions (con-
cepts or predicates); such descriptions de-
fine its intended properties. The object’s 
existence, as well as some of its properties, 
are causally dependent on the intention 
(Hilpinen, 1992, p. 60f.).
The last sentence of the quoted passage, which asserts a 
causal dependency of the object upon the maker’s intention, is 
compatible with both readings distinguished by Thomasson. 
However, the claim that the maker’s intention associates with 
the intended product “a number of descriptions (concepts or 
predicates)”, which define the properties of the latter, makes 
Hilpinen’s characterization a clear example of the opaque 
reading. This view is reinforced by Hilpinen’s claim that some 
of the properties of an artefact are counterfactually depen-
dent on the descriptions of properties that figure as contents 
of the maker’s intention (Hilpinen, 1992, p. 64f.). 
Thomasson argues for a similar characterization of the 
relation between an artefact and the content of the intention 
of its maker. According to her, an object belongs to an arte-
factual kind only if it is the product of a largely successful in-
tention of the maker to produce an object that exemplifies 
her substantive concept of that artefactual kind (Thomasson, 
2003, p. 599f.). In other words, something is an artefact if it 
has, to a significant extent, properties corresponding to the 
maker’s substantive concept of the respective artefactual kind. 
Based on this dependency relation, Thomasson concludes 
that makers have a “privileged epistemic position” about the 
nature of the artefacts they produce (Thomasson, 2003, 
p. 602), which she also describes as “some incorrigible first-or-
der knowledge” (Thomasson, 2003, p. 603).
Thomasson’s argument to the conclusion that some 
people might have a privileged epistemic position concern-
ing the nature of institutional entities is based on a particular 
view about their constitution. In a general sense, this view 
says that a group of people constitutes an institutional entity 
by determining through collective acceptance the sufficient 
conditions for something to be an instantiation of the insti-
tution’s kind. In other words, they determine the features 
that make an institutional entity or kind what it is. Thom-
asson concludes that, since those who constitute an institu-
tional entity determine the features that make it what it is, 
they have a privileged epistemic position with respect to the 
nature of the constituted entity (Thomasson, 2003, p. 589f.). 
In order to illustrate Thomasson’s position, consider the case 
of a reading group. A reading group is established when two 
or more people agree to meet regularly to discuss texts they 
will read beforehand. The founders/members of the read-
ing group determine when they will meet, the texts that are 
going to be discussed, etc. The features that are determined 
in this way compose the nature of the group, together with 
the notion of a group of people getting together regularly to 
discuss some texts. According to Thomasson’s position, each 
founder/member of a reading group knows the features that 
characterize the nature of the reading group in a privileged 
way. They do not need to investigate or consider evidence to 
know if the group will continue to exist in the forthcoming 
semester. They simply agree about it.
Thomasson’s arguments are compelling. In my opinion, 
they effectively lead us to the conclusion that those who con-
stitute or produce intended IRs have a “privileged epistemic 
position” with regard to their nature. However, I do not think 
this privileged position justifies the claim that the nature of 
these IRs can be known independently of any investigation 
and interpretation of evidence. In the following, I argue that 
the intended intentionality-relative features of the world are 
also epistemically objective.
A maker and a person who takes part in the constitution 
of institutional entities know the features they try to impose 
on the products of their activities. They know them because 
these features are part of the content of their intention. How-
ever, this knowledge does not imply that they know the fea-
tures (or the nature) of the product of their activities. One 
strong reason in support of this claim is that such creative 
activities may fail at some point. It is evident that someone’s 
intention is not sufficient for producing an artefact or con-
stituting an institutional entity. Other conditions must also 
be met, and if these are not satisfied, then the artifact or the 
institutional entity might lack some of the intended features, 
or might not even exist. An artefact-maker may fail to ob-
tain an intended product for different reasons, which extend 
from the use of bad materials or the incorrect employment 
of a technique to unfavourable environmental conditions. A 
person who wants to start a reading group may be persuaded 
that she has established one, even though the other putative 
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members of the group have lied to her about their participa-
tion and secretly decided never to meet. 
In order to know the nature of an artefact or an institu-
tional entity, those who have made or constitute them need 
evidence that their intentions have been successful, i.e., that 
the intended IRs have the features that they tried to impose to 
them. Without evidence of this kind, an artefact maker can-
not justify her belief concerning the features of the product 
of her activities; and the same applies to a person who takes 
part in the constitution of an institutional entity. Evidence 
of a successful production or constitution might be obtained 
during or after the process aimed at realizing the intentions. 
In some cases, those who produce or constitute entities do 
not need any further investigation to justify their knowledge 
about the nature of the products of their creative activities. 
The process might be such that enough evidence is obtained 
by anyone who employs it. However, even in these cases, the 
maker’s knowledge of the features of an artefact or an insti-
tutional entity is based on evidence she has had to interpret.
Makers can be said to hold a privileged epistemic po-
sition with regard to the nature of the IRs they produce be-
cause they determine the features that these IRs are expected 
to have. In investigating these things, they would not make 
substantive discoveries with regard to their nature, but only 
verify the presence of the expected features. However, the 
privileged epistemic position enjoyed by makers does not im-
ply knowledge of the nature of the intended IRs. As argued 
above, such knowledge depends on evidence that reveals the 
success of the production or constitution. 
The dependence of knowledge concerning intended IRs 
on evidence justifies the claim that intended IRs are epistemi-
cally objective, i.e., that they can only be known in an indirect, 
mediated way. There should be no doubt that the same posi-
tion applies to what I referred above as unintended IRs. Our 
knowledge about their nature and instantiation is not facili-
tated by any privileged epistemic position. Therefore, I argue 
that, similarly to natural entities, all intentionality-relative 
features of the world are epistemically objective.
By considering IRs in accordance with Searle’s categories 
of the epistemically subjective and the epistemically objective, 
we conclude that (ii) some IRs are epistemically objective. 
The predicate “epistemically objective” applies, in this sense, 
to judgments whose truth-value is independent from opin-
ions and the facts that determine the truth-value of these 
judgments. The distinction inspired by Davidson supports a 
more categorical statement about IRs. It allows us to assert 
that all IRs are epistemically objective, in the sense that they 
can only be known by means of external evidence. Since this 
characterization is more elucidative about the nature of IRs 
in general, I replace the item (ii) that corresponds to Searle’s 
positive characterization of IRs with:
(ii)*  All intentionality-relative features of the world are 
epistemically objective, in the sense that they can 
only be known by means of external evidence.
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